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Ten years ago, in 2007, one of the authors of this paper was asked to assess the macroeconomic state of Portugal (Blanchard 2007). 1 At the time, things did not look good. After a boom in the 1990s and then a long slump in the 2000s, unemployment was high. Growth was low. Both the scal and the current account decits were large. Household and corporate debts were high.
His assessment was that, absent major policy action, there was little scope for optimism. The adjustment process was likely to be a long and painful one, one of continuing high unemployment and low growth, until downward wage and price pressure would make Portugal more competitive again. Along the way, risks of derailment were high.
We shall never know what would have happened, absent major shocks.
There were two major shocks. The rst was the global nancial crisis of [2008] [2009] , the second the euro crisis of 2010-2012. Their combined result was a sharp contraction in demand, coming initially from the fall in exports and investment, then from tighter bank credit, and nally from scal consolidation. By 2013, Portugal was in many ways in worse shape than in 2007. Unemployment was higher, growth was negative. The scal decit was smaller, but government debt was much higher. The current account balance was roughly balanced, but this partly reected import compression, namely the decrease in imports due to the fall in output. Both household and corporate debt were still high.
Since then, a timid recovery has taken place. Growth is low, but positive.
Unemployment has decreased, but remains high. The scal decit is getting smaller, the current account shows a small surplus. But debt, private and public, remains high. High debt and low growth are leading to an increasing proportion of non-performing loans. On the other hand, some structural reforms have taken place. The forecasts up to 2021 are for positive but low growth, a slow decrease in unemployment, while maintaining current account balance.
The risks of derailment are still present.
The purpose of this paper is the same as that of the 2007 paper: To review the history, and discuss current policy options. It is organized in two sections:
The rst section is a review of the past, present, and expected future. It comes in four subsections, each corresponding to the four phases of the recent Portuguese macroeconomic history: The boom, the slump, the two crises, and the timid recovery.
2 Such a review is not just of historical interest; it is essential in thinking about policy options going forward.
The second section examines current policy options. It rst emphasizes some of the trade-os facing an economy with high debt and insucient competitiveness. For example, in an environment of very low euro ination, 1. He already had substantial help from the coauthor of this paper.
2. Two other reviews, which overlap in part with this paper are by Ricardo Reis (2013) , (2015) . Throughout, we also rely on the information in the annual OECD surveys of Portugal and various IMF documents, from article IVs to reviews and post-program monitoring reports of the -2014 improving price competitiveness may require deation, which however increases the real value of both private and public debt: The improvement in external demand may come at the expense of a deterioration of internal demand. In an environment of high public debt, increasing internal demand through scal expansion may lead to worries about debt sustainability, to increased spreads, and, in the end, be self defeating.
Nevertheless, we end up with some policy recommendations, both for policies to follow and for policies not to follow.
The priority is to decrease the remaining output gap and to decrease unemployment faster than under current forecasts. Because some progress has actually been made, reestablishing competitiveness, which still needs to be achieved, is less of a priority than it was ten years ago.
There is no magic tool to do so. The best policy option is, we believe, to clean banks' balance sheets of their non-performing loans, recapitalize them adequately, and, in a number of cases, change their governance structure. While it would be best if the recapitalization funds came either from the private sector or from the European Union, we believe there is a strong case for nancing them through domestic public debt. The initial increase in the budget decit is likely to be more than fully compensated through higher growth and lower decits later.
One can reasonably hope that a better functioning banking system will lead not only to just cyclically higher growth, but also to higher potential growth. It is clear however that more is needed to sustain higher potential growth. As was argued in a now old McKinsey report (which had triggered the earlier paper by one of the authors) (McKinsey 2003) , and in a number of reports since then, the productivity gap between Portugal and other euro members is large and would seem, on paper, relatively easy to reduce. Yet, the performance of productivity since that report came out has been poor. We believe that for the time being the main reforms should focus on the product market. Some labor market reforms, focusing on micro-exibility, are also essential; others, focusing on macro-exibility, may, in the current environment, be counterproductive, and should wait until the economy has become stronger.
1. A macroeconomic review of the last twenty years 1.1. The Boom. 1995 -2001 The Portuguese boom started in the mid-1990s. The anticipation of participation in the euro, and the resulting anticipated decrease in country and exchange rate risk, made foreign investors in general and euro zone banks in particular, eager to lend to Portugal. The anticipation that participation in the euro would lead to faster convergence and higher growth made Portuguese consumers and rms eager to borrow more.
The result was a dramatic decrease in both nominal and real interest rates, and an increase in private debt, in particular an increase in consumer debt. From 1995 to 2001, the long-term nominal rate on government bonds decreased from 11.5% to 5%, and as ination remained roughly constant, this implied a largely similar decrease in the long-term real rate. As capital inows were largely intermediated by Portuguese banks, they increasingly relied on wholesale funding. The ratio of loans to deposits rose from 75% in 1997 to 128% in 2001.
Household debt increased from 52% to 118% of disposable income, non nancial corporate debt from 121% to 147% of GDP. Fiscal policy, measured by the cyclically adjusted primary balance, was pro-cyclical, but given high growth and high ination, the ratio of gross government debt to GDP decreased slightly, from 58% down to 53%. (The specic numbers for each year are given in four successive tables, corresponding to the four phases of the story. Table   1 gives the main numbers for the years 1995 to 2001).
Higher demand resulted in strong growth, 3.5% per year on average. The unemployment rate, which stood at 6.6% in 1995, decreased to 4.4% by 2001. While (business sector) productivity growth remained at 2% on average, nominal wages increased at 4.2% a year, leading to an increase in unit labor costs in the business sector over the period of 18.6%, substantially above the corresponding euro average of 4.8%.
The combination of strong growth and, by implication, strong imports, together with a decrease in competitiveness (measured as an increase in the relative unit labor cost relative to the euro unit labor cost), led to a deterioration of the current account balance from -0.2% of GDP in 1995 to -10.4% in 2001.
In short, in 2001 the Portuguese economy was operating above potential.
Household debt was sharply higher. As a result of high imports, the current account decit was large.
The Slump 2002-2007
In 2002 the boom turned into a slump. The main proximate cause was a decrease in domestic demand.
When the Blanchard (2007) paper was written, one of the explanations for this decrease was disappointment that the euro had not delivered, and that the hoped for labor productivity growth had not materialized, leading consumers and rms to cut spending. At the time, the numbers reported for productivity growth were indeed extremely low, 0.3% on average for [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . The numbers have been revised and now show stronger productivity growth, 1.4% on average for the period! 3 It may still be that the decrease in 3. Part of the revisions come from a change in denition, from number of workers to number of full-time equivalents as a measure of employment, and the reclassication of And, in contrast to the earlier response, but in response to the induced sharp increase in debt which worried markets, scal policy was strongly contractionary, with the cyclically adjusted primary balance going from a decit of 9.8% in 2010 to a surplus of 2.3% by 2013.
Together, the two shocks had a large adverse eect on growth. Average growth over the period was a negative 1.3%. As a result, the unemployment rate, already high to start with, increased from 8.7% to 16.2%. And despite the sharp reduction in the decit, government debt increased from 78% of GDP in 2007 to 141% in 2013, while household and corporate debt remained at very high levels. High debt and low growth combined to increase non-performing loans: Non-performing loans to non-nancial corporates increased from 3.8% in 2008 to 16.1% in 2013.
The only apparently good news was the sharp improvement in the current account balance, from a decit of 9.7% in 2007 to a surplus of 1.4% in 2013.
But this was in fact mixed news. Much of the decrease in the decit was due to import compression, with a decrease in imports reecting the decrease in output. Some of the decrease however was due to the strong performance of exports. Over the period, exports increased by 2.8% a year, reecting an increase in Portugal's market share.
4. The analysis of the two crises, the exact nature of the nancial shocks, the relative roles of the credit crunch and of scal policy, deserve a much longer treatment than we can give here. Growth rate export volume 7.3 -0.3 -10.2 9.5 7.0 3.4 6.9 Growth rate import volume 5.4 2.4 -9.9 7.8 -5.8 -6.3 4.6 Table 3 . Macroeconomic evolutions, 2007 Macroeconomic evolutions, -2013 . This stronger performance of exports was not expected, and why exports did well has important implications for the future, but is not settled. Despite low productivity growth, nominal wage growth was suciently low that unit labor costs increased very little during the period: Over 2007-2013, nominal
GDP growth
Portuguese unit labor costs in the business sector increased by only 2.7%, 11.6% less than the euro average. Low growth of unit labor costs however did not translate into low growth of export prices. Put another way, the decrease in costs led to an increase in prot margins rather than a decrease in relative prices. A plausible hypothesis is that many Portuguese exporting rms are price takers in foreign markets, and the increase in margins allowed them to invest and increase market share.
5 If this is the mechanism, it has
5. An alternative hypothesis is that rms, which were facing much lower domestic demand, had no alternative but to explore foreign markets (see Esteves and Rua, 2015) . We have explored this hypothesis using rm level data and have not found signicant quantitative support for the hypothesis.
important implications in partially delinking movements in prices from export performance, implications to which we shall return later.
In short, relative to the situation in 2007, Portugal in 2013 faced a much worse internal imbalance, a much higher unemployment rate. It also faced higher levels of debt, now not only household and corporate debt, but also government debt. The external imbalance had improved, although the positive current account balance still reected in part the very low level of economic activity.
The timid recovery. 2014-2021
Since 2014, GDP growth has turned positive but has remained low, averaging 6 Looking forward however, the decline is very slow: Even by the end of the forecast horizon, the unemployment rate is forecast to still be 8.8%.
The IMF forecasts are for the ULC-based real exchange rate to remain roughly constant throughout the period. Exports are forecast to grow at a substantially higher rate than GDP, but imports are forecast to grow even faster. The trade balance, and the current account balance are forecast to slowly deteriorate, with the current account reaching -1.6% in 2021.
With low growth, ratios of private or public debt to GDP are not forecast to decrease by much. The forecast for the ratio of public debt to GDP is roughly the same in 2021 as in 2013, 124% versus 129%. And, more worrisome, low growth has led to a steady increase in the ratio of non-performing loans to non-nancial corporations, reaching 19.8% in 2015.
In short, the dominant aspects of the current macroeconomic situation are low productivity growth and, by implication, low potential growth.
Unemployment is forecast to still be high by the end of the forecast horizon.
External imbalances have been reduced, although the current account surplus reects in part low output, and will turn into a decit as growth continues.
High debt and non-performing loans are aecting both demand in the short run, and investment and productivity in the medium run.
6. The fall in unemployment is surprisingly large in view of the low growth rate of output.
Part of the earlier increase and part of this decrease is due to measurement issues coming Still large internal imbalances
Portugal still suers from a large internal imbalance, i.e from output still far below potential. The OECD puts the output gap at -3.1% of GDP, the IMF at -1.4%, and the European Union at a small -0.7%. If correct, assuming an Okun coecient (i.e. a semi-elasticity of the unemployment rate to output) of -0.6 (the estimate used by the Bank of Portugal), and a current unemployment rate of 11.1%, this would imply that the Portuguese natural unemployment rate is around 10 to 11%. These estimates of the natural unemployment rate appear very pessimistic. By implication, the small OECD, IMF, and EU output gaps appear too small, too optimistic.
The question should be asked this way: The natural unemployment rate in Portugal before the crisis was probably around 5-6%. Are there reasons to think that it has roughly doubled?
Some factors go in the direction of an increase in the rate: Many of the unemployed are low-skilled, and some of the low-skill jobs that they have lost have probably disappeared. It is not clear that all of them could be reemployed.
Long-term unemployment accounts for 62% of unemployment, as opposed to about 40% before the crisis, and the duration of unemployment among the longterm unemployed itself has increased. Hysteresis, that is the eect of long-term unemployment on morale, on skills, and on employability, is likely to have led some of the long-term unemployed to become unemployable. The size of this eect on the natural rate of unemployment is dicult to assess. A study by
Vansteenkiste (2017) Some factors work in the opposite direction. Given that older workers and college graduates tend to have lower unemployment rates, aging of the labor force and the increase in the proportion of college graduates should decrease the natural rate; quantitatively however this eect is small.
Have the labor market reforms aected the natural rate? There are both theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that they have not had a major eect. On theoretical grounds, reforms of employment protection, such as tighter limits on severance pay, change the nature of unemployment, but do not necessarily decrease the natural unemployment rate. They tend to decrease the duration of unemployment, but they increase the ows in and out of unemployment. Given that unemployment is the product of duration and ows, the rst eect tends to decrease unemployment, the second to increase it, with an ambiguous net eect on unemployment.
7 Empirically, the scope of reforms has been limited. The reform of severance pay grandfathered existing contracts.
Some of the other reforms were cancelled by the Constitutional Court. Thus, it is unlikely that, for the moment, the reforms have had a major eect on the natural unemployment rate.
These considerations lead us to conclude that the increase in the natural rate is unlikely to exceed 2%, so that the natural rate itself is unlikely to be higher than 7-8%. If we again assume an Okun coecient of -0.6, this implies an output gap around 5-7%. Nobody can be sure, but the only way to nd out what the right number is to try to get there... It would be a mistake to assume that the economy is operating close to potential.
High private and public debt, and high non-performing loans Both private and public debt are high. Household debt exceeds 130% of disposable income; the debt of non-nancial corporations exceeds 200% of GDP;
Government debt exceeds 130% of GDP. Debt service is unusually low, with the low rates reecting the ECB policy. Higher nominal rates, from the termination of the asset purchase program, or from tighter macroeconomic conditions at the euro level, or from worries by investors about debt sustainability, would all cause serious diculties to rms, households, or the government.
After various episodes of recapitalisation, most banks now have reasonable capital ratios. But the proportion of non-performing loans (NPLs) on their books is high and worrisome. A study by Bonm et al (2016) , based on the credit registry, nds that in 2014 (the latest year for which the data are available), 20% of Portuguese rms had negative equity. The proportion was highest for micro rms (rms with fewer than 10 workers), 24%, but it was still a high 8% for small rms, and 5% for medium and large rms. There is evidence of evergreening: Of the rms with negative equity, 33% received a new loan in 2014, and, among those in default, 12% received a new loan... Not only do high
NPLs threaten the protability of banks, but they also imply a misallocation of funds, with fewer funds available to stronger rms.
Remaining external imbalances
The large current account decits of the past are gone, but Portugal still suers from an underlying external imbalance. The proximate reason why the current account balance is positive is that the output gap is negative and large.
Were the output gap equal to zero, output would be higher, and so would be imports, deteriorating the trade balance and the current account.
A simple computation is useful here: If domestic demand increased so as to return output to potential, the trade balance as a ratio to GDP would deteriorate by an amount equal to the output gap times the ratio of imports to GDP (about 40%) times the elasticity of imports to GDP (about 1.5).
Assuming, from the argument and computation above, that the output gap is, say, 5 to 7%, the trade balance, and by implication, the current account balance, would worsen by about 3 to 4.2% (0.4*1.5*(5 to 7%) of GDP. It thus would be equal to -2.8 to -3.4% of GDP. While the current account does not have to be balanced, this is larger than it should be.
Clearly, the more exports contributed to the increase in demand and the return of output to potential, the less the trade balance would deteriorate.
Export growth has actually been relatively strong. Table 4 however are for both strong export and import growth, without a substantial net contribution of the foreign sector to growth.
Low productivity growth
Competitiveness is not the same as productivity. It is just a statement that costs and prices are in line with productivity. Productivity, and productivity growth, matter however very much on their own, primarily because they determine the evolution of the standard of living, but also because higher productivity growth, and by implication higher potential growth, makes it easier to reduce very high private and public debt ratios.
Productivity gaps between Portugal and the rest of Europe have been well documented and are quite striking. Based on 2015 numbers from the OECD STAN database, labor productivity relative to Germany was 38% in manufacturing, 54% in construction, 81% in trade. Relative to Spain, these three numbers were 43%, 37%, and 80% respectively.
9 The same is true for productivity growth. A somewhat old study by Bassassini and Scarpetta (2001) estimating growth regressions for OECD countries concluded that, given observable characteristics such as education, income per capita, etc, Portugal's 8. This increase in markups is also present in Spain, Italy, and Greece. We have looked at the evolution of wages, productivity, unit labor costs, and markups at the sectoral level in Portugal and have not been able to detect a clear pattern. One fact, which argues against the explanation in the text, is that there is no clear dierence between the evolution of markups in tradable versus non-tradable sectors. One would expect rms to be more price makers in the non-tradable sector, and thus to pass on lower unit labor costs through prices; this does not appear to be the case.
9. Estimates from another data source, the KLEMS data base, for 2006 (the latest available year) were roughly similar except for trade, in which relative labor productivity was estimated to be much lower, 44%. The dierence comes from dierent denitions of the trade sector in the two data sets. Trade includes transportation and storage, accomodation and food services in the OECD data set, not in the KLEMS data set.
growth per capita from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s was a large negative outlier, with growth 1.5% below the regression predictions.
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This large productivity gap is both bad news and good news. To the extent that the constraints can be identied, the scope for large productivity improvements and thus for high productivity growth is clearly there.
11 Within the Troika program, Portugal has implemented a number of structural reforms.
Perhaps the most visible one, in terms of results, has been the liberalization of the housing market, but it does not lead directly to an increase in productivity.
The other reforms get mixed assessments. The OECD has a rather positive view, with Portugal moving from the 24th to the 10th rank with respect to the product market regulation index. The assessment of product market reforms by the IMF in its ex-post assessment of the program (2016) is less positive, in particular about reforms of the energy market and of judicial processes.
And, as we saw in Table 4 , the IMF forecasts of productivity growth are quite pessimistic.
Policy choices
Our goal in this section is to examine a number of policy choices. We do this from a macroeconomic viewpoint, leaving aside the issue of whether they are consistent with EU or euro-zone institutional constraints, whether they are politically realistic or not.
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Higher Euro ination.
10. Productivity growth was surprisingly high during the crisis. Large decreases in output are typically associated with large decreases in productivity, as rms cut employment less than output. This was not the case, and measured productivity growth was actually high in 2010. In thinking about the future, it is important to understand why this was. One hypothesis is that many rms were nancially constrained, and thus were forced to shed labor to survive. In ongoing work, we have found some evidence that this was indeed the case. A rm level regression based on balance sheet and credit registry data from 2005 to 2015 shows that more nancially constrained rms, i.e. rms having either a probability of default in the upper quartile or rms or having a negative EBIT (negative earnings before interest and taxes), decreased employment more than other rms. This increase in productivity must be seen as a one o , unlikely to be repeated in the future. are not ready yet, will either be presented as an appendix to the paper or as a separate contribution later.
It is useful to start with a policy choice which is clearly not in the hands of Portugal, but is nevertheless highly relevant. Eurozone ination has been and is below target. A higher rate of ination for the euro zone would strengthen the recovery in Portugal. One of the authors has suggested that going above the target of 2% would be desirable (Blanchard et al 2010) ; even reaching the target would be useful.
The reason why higher euro ination would help is the following: Even if, as we have seen, export growth has taken place so far without a decrease in Portuguese relative prices, improving price competitiveness would reinforce this process, allow for a more export-based recovery in demand, reducing both internal and external imbalances. With very low euro ination, improving price competitiveness requires however even lower ination in Portugal, perhaps even deation. Deation however increases the real value of nominal debt, be it private or public, and is thus likely to decrease domestic demand.
Even if
higher price competitiveness leads to higher foreign demand, the adverse eect on domestic demand may well dominate.
In short, higher euro ination would allow for an improvement in price competitiveness without requiring Portuguese deation, and thus without increasing the real value of debt.
Labor market reforms.
The need for more labor market exibility is an old mantra from international organizations, be it the European Union, the OECD, or the IMF.
It is essential however to distinguish between two dimensions of exibility.
14 One is highly desirable, the other, in the current Portuguese context, is not.
The rst is micro exibility, the ability of the economy to allow for the reallocation of workers to jobs needed to sustain growth. The gold standard is what is known as ex security, the optimal combination of exibility for rms and security for workers. The four central labor market institutions in play here are employment protection, unemployment insurance, professional training and retraining. The evidence is that such exibility is an important determinant of reallocation and, in turn, of productivity growth.
Despite recent reforms on this front, more must be done. One pitfall of many employment reforms has been to decrease employment protection at the 13. Somebody's debt is somebody else's claim. This raises the issue of why the positive eect of the reduced value of the debt is not oset by the negative eect of the reduced value of the claim. The answer is twofold. Even if debt is held domestically, the net eect comes from the asymmetry between the behavior of borrowers and of lenders. Borrowers are more likely to be constrained and thus react more strongly to the decrease in debt than the lenders do to the decrease in their claim. And, to the extent that debt is largely held by foreign creditors, the increase in their spending falls largely on their domestic goods rather than on Portuguese goods.
14. This builds on Blanchard et al 2013 margin by creating two categories of workers, permanent workers with strong employment protection, and temporary workers, without such protection. This duality has turned out to have strong adverse eects, both in terms of the nature of unemployment, and in terms of productivity growth. While it allows rms to adjust employment through hiring and ring of temporary workers, it gives them few incentives to train and keep those temporary workers.
The result has been the emergence of two classes of workers, those who are lucky enough to have a permanent job, and those who alternate temporary contracts and unemployment, are not given additional training, and have poor career paths. Reforms should thus aim at reducing this duality, simplifying employment protection and making its cost more predictable for rms. Reforms of professional training, making it more closely matched to rms' needs, such as the reform in the program by President Macron in France, also can make a large dierence.
A related and important issue for Portugal is the employment of workers with low levels of education. There is some evidence that the [2008] [2009] [2010] increases in the minimum wage had an adverse eect on employment (Carneiro et al 2011 , Centeno et al 2011 . At 530 euros a month in December 2016, the minimum wage was already close to 60% of the median wage, the ratio at which most economists believe it starts having substantial adverse eects on employment. Unless social contributions are reduced (more on this below), the plan to increase it to 600 euros by January 2019, when it would cover 30% of workers, is likely to have an adverse eect on employment.
The second dimension is macro exibility, the ability to adjust wages and prices in response to changes in productivity or to competitiveness issues, so as to maintain internal and external balance. In general, macro exibility is highly desirable. Such lack of exibility can be seen as the main reason why the Portuguese economy has suered for so long from the aftereects of its initial boom. Indeed, in 2007, one of the authors of this paper argued for a tripartite argument to reestablish competitiveness through a coordinated decrease in wages and prices. The situation is however dierent today. As we saw, the external imbalance is substantially smaller, so the need for such adjustment is smaller. And debt, in particular government debt, is much higher, implying a stronger adverse eect of lower prices on the real value of debt and on domestic demand.
Product market reforms.
As was discussed earlier, the large gaps in productivity levels between
Portugal and other European countries, even controlling for the low level of education in Portugal, suggest that product market reforms that facilitate entry and increase competition could have large eects on productivity. Thus, they should remain a priority.
Product market reforms however share one potential danger with macro exibility reforms. To the extent that they lead to lower prices, they may lead, as do decreases in nominal wages, to lower ination or even deation, increasing the real value of debt and decreasing demand and output in the short run.
15 However, in contrast with nominal wage decreases, expectations of higher potential growth in the future are likely to increase consumption and investment demand, and more than oset adverse eects of higher real debt. Also, and not irrelevant, product market reforms are typically much less politically costly than labor market reforms (which have stronger distribution eects).
Fiscal consolidation.
Should scal consolidation proceed at a faster pace than is currently planned? The arithmetic of scal consolidation at a given interest rate and a given exchange rate is extremely unattractive. A decrease in the cyclically adjusted primary surplus of, say, 1% is likely to decrease demand and output by at least 1%, but to reduce the debt to GDP ratio by substantially less than 1%, leading to an initial reduction in the debt to GDP ratio from, say, 129% to, say, 128.5%. Given low forecast growth in the absence of scal consolidation, 1%
less growth because of scal consolidation may mean close to zero growth, in exchange for a very small decrease in the debt to GDP ratio. And to the extent that low growth leads to lower ination, this small decrease in the volume of debt may even be oset by an increase in the real value of debt.
There are clearly circumstances when scal consolidation is needed despite its output cost, namely when investors start doubting debt sustainability; this was the motivation behind the strong scal consolidation from 2009 on.
16
Circumstances are however dierent today, and do not justify stronger scal consolidation. The decrease in the debt to GDP ratio will be in any case a very slow process, and the priority should be to increase growth, both cyclical and potential, to allow for a faster reduction in the ratio over time.
This does not rule out changes in the composition of revenues and spending.
We shall mention two. One, which was discussed at length but dismissed, is scal devaluation, i.e. a decrease in social security contributions in exchange for an increase in the VAT rate. We are not sure at this point that such a measure is still justied; the issue is more what the right VAT rate should be.
A variation of the theme, aimed primarily at reducing the cost of labor is the nancing of health and unemployment benets through the income tax rather 16. We shall not re-litigate here whether the scal consolidation was excessive or not.
Given the nearly total loss of market access, the speed of scal consolidation was largely determined by the size of the Troika program.
President Macron in France.) Yet, another measure aimed at reducing the cost of low-skilled labor, and which has been adopted by a number of other countries, would be a reduction of the tax wedge for low-wage workers, a wedge currently equal to a high 39%.
Fiscal expansion.
If faster scal consolidation is bad, could scal expansion, in the face of such a high debt to GDP ratio, be justied? We believe that it may well be, if the increase in the decit is used to increase potential growth. If so, even if the eect on potential growth is modest, the eect may be not only to increase growth, which is desirable on its own, but to eventually decrease the debt to GDP ratio and thus decrease the risk that debt is unsustainable. In other words, the right scal expansion may not increase spreads, but indeed potentially decrease them.
This argument has been used to argue for increased infrastructure investment, nanced by public debt. This is what underlies the Juncker plan at the European Union level, which however is quantitatively too limited. The case for such investment spending may be stronger in some countries than in others.
The past experience of Portugal makes one worried that the wrong investment projects (airports or fast trains, rather than education) will be chosen. Yet, the decrease in public investment as a ratio to GDP from 5% in the late 1990s to 1.5% in 2016 suggests that an increase would be desirable and justied.
Two other uses appear to us as or even more promising. The rst is the use of the increased decit to help pass and nance structural reforms. To the extent that some structural reforms have winners and losers, it may often be politically wise, as well as socially justied, to partly compensate the losers.
The second is the use of the increased decit to recapitalize the banks. This gets us to our next point.
Treatment of non-performing loans.
As we have seen, the proportion of non-performing loans is high, the result of low growth, and, in turn, almost surely a relevant constraint on growth. There is substantial evidence that non-performing loans seriously impair nancial intermediation, as banks continue to lend either to zombie rms or to rms with low protability rather than to new or more protable rms (Caballero et al (2008) on Japan). And there is also some evidence that cleaning up these loans can substantially increase growth (Balgova et al 2016) . The cleaning up is however only a necessary condition. Recapitalization of banks, and changes in governance so the problem does not recur in the future, are both required.
It is easy to see how recapitalization, and the removal of NPLs, can have large multiplier eects, and, if nanced through decit spending, lead to a decrease in the ratio of public debt to GDP. Suppose the capital ratio constraint is binding on credit supply. Then for any one euro increase in capital, bank credit supply may potentially increase by one over the capital ratio, thus by ten euros or more. While this increase in nancial intermediation by banks implies a decrease elsewhere (so long as the saving rate does not change), we know that bank credit is often the only source of credit for SMEs, and many of those are still credit constrained. Thus, the eect on total credit, and in turn on investment and growth of SMEs is likely to be substantial. Thus, even if this increase is nanced by public debt, the eect on demand of the higher credit supply is likely to largely exceed the adverse eect of higher government debt on government spending.
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A similar argument applies to the removal of NPLs. To the extent that NPLs are replaced by credit to non-zombie rms, the eect on investment and growth can again be very large. This is where there is a natural interaction between the case for scal expansion and the treatment of non-performing loans. It would clearly be best if recapitalization were achieved through private funds, but this has proven dicult. The next best option is to recapitalize through the use of European, rather than Portuguese funds, thus not adding to the Portuguese public debt. If it is not available, there is still a strong case for doing it through decit spending and an increase in Portuguese public debt.
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Euro exit.
A discussion of this policy choice is often avoided altogether, but this is counterproductive. We believe there are good reasons to reject this option for Portugal at this point.
19 One of the main weaknesses of the euro construction is indeed the diculty of adjusting relative prices and reestablishing competitiveness. Thus, if a country suers from a very large competitiveness gap and appears unable to decrease it, a discussion of euro exit makes sense, despite the very large transition costs, the likely need to restructure debt after the depreciation and the loss of market access. As we have argued however, the competitiveness problem of Portugal has been largely, although not entirely, resolved, and thus the main rationale for exit is much weaker than it might have been earlier. This does not imply that the Euro is a perfect system, just that getting out of the Euro is almost surely not worth it for Portugal at this point.
17. This is an example of a more general proposition, that reallocating debt among debtors, in this case from the banks to the government, is not neutral, as the eects of public debt on government spending may well be less than the eects of private debt on private spending.
18. Such recapitalization and decit spending run into the various constraints on nancial rules and on scal policy imposed by the European Union. As we indicated earlier, we are discussing policy options based on their macroeconomic merits, whether or not they are consistent with current Portuguese or European Union rules.
19. Thus, we disagree with the statement by Joseph Stiglitz that It costs more to Portugal to stay in the Euro than to leave. (2016).
Conclusions
Over the past 20 years, Portugal has gone through a boom, a slump, a sudden stop, and now a timid recovery. Unemployment has decreased, but remains high, and output is still far below potential. Competitiveness has improved, but more is needed to keep the current account in check as the economy recovers. Private and public debt are high, the legacies of the boom, the slump and the sudden stop. Productivity growth and thus potential growth remain low. Because of high debt and low growth, the recovery remains fragile. For example, worries about debt sustainability could lead to higher interest rates, and be largely self-fullling.
In this context, we have reviewed a number of policy options, ranging from scal consolidation to scal expansion, to cleaning of non-performing loans, to labor market and product market reforms, and to euro exit.
We have argued that, at this point, the focus of macroeconomic policy should be twofold. The rst is on the treatment of non-performing loans, which would allow for stronger nancial intermediation, and lead to an increase in demand in the short run and an increase in supply in the medium run. We argue that, to the extent that such treatment requires recapitalization, this may justify recapitalization by the state, and thus a scal expansion, even in the face of high public debt. The second is on product market reforms, and reforms aimed at increasing micro-exibility in the labor market.
Symmetrically, we have also argued that, at this point, some policies would be highly undesirable, among them stronger scal consolidation, measures aimed at decreasing nominal wages and prices, and euro exit.
